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Abstract. Modern port infrastructures have become highly dependent on the 
operation of complex, dynamic ICT-based maritime supply chains. This makes 
them open and vulnerable to the rapidly changing ICT threat landscape and 
many ports are not yet fully prepared for that. Furthermore, these supply chains 
represent highly interrelated cyber ecosystem, in which a plethora of distributed 
ICT systems of various business partners interact with each other. Due to these 
interrelations, isolated threats and vulnerabilities within a system of a single 
business partner may propagate and have cascading effects on multiple other 
systems, thus resulting in a large-scale impact on the whole supply chain. In this 
context, this article proposes a novel evidence-driven risk assessment method-
ology, i.e., the MITIGATE methodology, to analyze the risk level of the whole 
maritime supply chain. This methodology builds upon publicly available infor-
mation, well-defined mathematical approaches and best practices to automati-
cally identify and assess vulnerabilities and potential threats of the involved 
cyber assets. As a major benefit, the methodology provides a constantly updated 
risk evaluation not only of all cyber assets within each business partner in the 
supply chain but also of the cyber interconnections among those business part-
ners. Additionally, the whole process is based on qualitative risk scales, which 
makes the assessment as well as the results more intuitive. The main goal of the 
MITIGATE methodology is to support the port authorities as well as the risk of-
ficers of all involved business partners. 
Keywords: Risk Assessment, Supply Chain Services, Critical Information In-
frastructures (CIIs) 
1 Introduction 
Over the last decades, logistics and supply chain services (SCS) have become 
globally distributed and interconnected. In particular in the maritime sector, there are 
multiple interdependencies between Critical Information Infrastructures (CIIs) (e.g., 
transport, energy and telecommunication networks), organizations (e.g., authorities, 
ministries and companies) as well as people, processes and services. Due to the ongo-
ing digitalization, the business partners involved in these supply chains are depending 
on a plethora of distributed information and communication technology (ICT) sys-
tems. With the goal to increase flexibility and efficiency in the supply chain, these 
ICT systems have evolved into a highly interrelated cyber ecosystem, where the com-
plexity and degree of networking of connected digital assets is going beyond compa-
ny borders. Nevertheless, precisely these interconnection points between the ICT 
systems also represent potential threats since they are possible entry points for un-
planned access to a business partner’s network and the systems located behind it. 
Hence, isolated vulnerabilities and related cyber incidents within one business partner 
may propagate in the overall network of interconnected ICT assets, putting the entire 
supply chain at risk. 
In the last years, the number of cyber incidents has increased, making cyber risks 
the second highest business risk in Europe [1]. Further, CIIs have moved into the 
center of cyber terrorists’ and activists’ attention, who want to deliberately compro-
mise the operation of CIIs and thus destroy their supply chains (at least for a certain 
amount of time) [6, 12]. Arguably, the number of disclosed cyber incidents in the 
transportation sector is not very high, yet, and can be considered to be even smaller in 
maritime supply chains [33]. Nevertheless, there have been several incidents within 
ports as the center of maritime supply chains [3], but also terminal cranes [31], cus-
toms [29], and supporting technology like the GPS systems [10, 34]. Most recent 
malware attacks like WannCry [4] and (Not)Petya [5, 7] also showed that no business 
partner involved in a maritime supply chain is immune to being attacked and hacked 
by malicious third parties. After all, a general awareness for the need of cyber security 
and cyber risk management has established in the course of these events. Neverthe-
less, state-of-the-art security frameworks for maritime environments (like [13] or 
[14]) pay limited attention to cyber-security and do not adequately address security 
and risk management processes for international maritime supply chains [26]. 
As the above-mentioned incidents show, attacks are not limited to a single organi-
zation any longer due to the highly interconnected and automated nature of modern 
supply chains. Looking at recent incidents in connection with WannaCry or 
(Not)Petya, these pieces of malware propagated over the ICT networks of several 
organizations only due to the high interconnection between these networks [4, 7]. 
Moreover, although the consequences within an organization might be limited, cas-
cading effects and their impact on connected business partners in the supply chain as 
well as on society as a whole have become highly relevant. Hence, the processes 
comprising a supply chain need to be protected from disclosure and exploitation. Un-
fortunately, the lack of visibility and traceability in the often opaque processes and 
practices used to develop and acquire ICT related products and services from each 
actor make this difficult. Consequently, intentional and unintentional compromise 
may be introduced through a variety of means, including counterfeit materials and 
malicious software, and might not be detect and remediate appropriately. Hence, there 
is a clear need for targeting sophisticated global risk assessment frameworks to deal 
with the threats, vulnerabilities and risks as well as their cascading effects associated 
with the ICT-based logistics and related supply chains. 
In this context, the present article introduces a rigorous, rational approach to risk 
management, which will produce high quality scientific and experimental based 
proofs and findings, including simulation results, indicators and recommendations in 
order to assist supply chain operators to evaluate and mitigate the risks they are faced 
with. The paper presents a novel integrated collaborative supply chain risk assessment 
methodology, which enables the involved supply chain business partners to collabo-
rate in the identification and classification of the various risks, while at the same time 
facilitating them in risk resolution and the creation of related supply chain plans. 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: in Section 2 we give an over-
view on supply chain risk management together with relevant standards and research 
work done on this topic. Section 3 presents the MITIGATE Methodology in detail, 
whereas the respective subsections describe each step of the methodology individual-
ly. A discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the methodology as well as it 
applicability is provided in Section Error! Reference source not found.; Section 4 
concludes the work. 
2 Supply Chain Risk Management 
2.1 Standards and Guidelines 
A structured and integrated risk management process has become a central part of 
the daily business of organizations in various sectors. Hence, several standards, and 
frameworks have been formulated, for example, ISO 31000 [17], ISO/IEC 27005 
[20], NIST SP800-30 [32], Cobit 5 for Risk [21] or others (cf. [8] for an extensive 
overview of risk management approaches). They provide methodologies and guide-
lines for businesses to implement such a risk management process. The traditional 
goal is to protect the business assets of an organization and minimize costs in case of 
failures and thus it represents a core duty of successful company management. As a 
major drawback, all the above mentioned standards and frameworks are designed to 
work within organizations, i.e., looking at their individual risk and how to tackle 
them.  
However, risk management is also essential in the provision of logistics and supply 
chain services. Instead of the individual risks, the connections and interdependencies 
between the various business partners are of central importance when assessing risks 
and their impacts. In this context, a plethora of assets from various organizations in-
teract and need to be protected from threats which might have an impact on the whole 
supply chain. To generate a supply chain security policy ensuring the secure operation 
of any logistic network or the secure provision of any supply chain service, the esti-
mation of risks and the development of appropriate protective measures for all (cross-
partner) assets involved in the supply chain are required. 
Among international standards, the ISO 28000 [15] and ISO 28001 [16] deal with 
the specification and guidelines for a supply chain risk management. In further detail, 
the ISO 28000 specifies a management system, which has been developed and intro-
duced in response to a demand from the transportation and logistics industry. The 
goal is a common security management standard, with the ultimate objective of im-
proving the overall security of supply chains. The ISO 28001 focuses more on the 
practical implementation of such management system. The main goal is to assist or-
ganizations in establishing reasonable levels of security and make better risk-based 
decisions for protection of the supply chain. Both the ISO 28000 and ISO 28001 are 
kept quite generic with the intention to be applicable to various sectors. Hence, they 
have to be tailored to fit to the context of maritime supply chains.  
Since both standards do not particularly consider ICT and information security, 
they are not very practical as a standalone framework for supply chains heavily based 
on the interaction of ICT systems (as, for example, in the maritime sector). For this 
purpose the ISO/IEC 27001 [18] and ISO/IEC 270002 [19] have been established. 
They are specifying the requirements for an information security management system 
(ISMS), i.e., in the ISO/IEC 27001, as well as a code of practice (in the ISO/IEC 
27002) providing details on how to implement such an ISMS within an organization. 
Risk management aspects in the context of information (and ICT) security are not 
covered by these two standards but rather by the additional ISO/IEC 27005 [20]. 
Hence, an organization within a maritime supply chain would have to implement 
aspects from both standards, ISO 28001 and ISO/IEC 27005, to come up with an 
appropriate supply chain risk management method.  
Besides the international standards, other methodologies have been developed, 
which are inspecting the high interdependencies between critical infrastructures in 
general. A first analysis approach for the interdependencies between critical infra-
structures is given in [30], describing several classes of interdependencies. Building 
on this classification, other approaches looked in further detail into the analysis of the 
interdependencies [2, 9, 28]. When it comes to analyzing the risk within the whole 
network of critical infrastructures, the cascading effects stemming directly from these 
interdependencies are an important factor. Identifying and assessing them is crucial 
and several methodologies have been presented in the past years [35, 11, 24, 22, 23]. 
These methodologies are applicable also for the analysis of cascading effects in mari-
time supply chains, since the interdependencies are the same as in the context of gen-
eral critical infrastructures. 
It has to be noted that the objectives of the above mentioned standards are not in-
tended to constitute a risk management method. Rather, these standards aim to estab-
lish a comprehensive framework and to describe requirements for the risk assessment 
process, for the identification of the threats and vulnerabilities allowing to estimate 
the risks in advance, their level and finally to define an effective treatment plan. Fur-
ther, the generic nature of these standards does not include the ability for the individ-
ual users (or business partners) to collaborate in the risk management process. 
 
 
2.2 Research Projects 
Although efforts have been made to standardize supply chain security risk assessment 
as mentioned above, there is a lack of targeted methodologies. The already completed 
project S-PORT1 took a first step towards a collaborative system for risk assessment 
and security management for maritime environments. However, the S-PORT method-
ology [26] focused on the internal security processes of a port, ignoring dimensions 
 
1 http://s-port.unipi.gr/  
relating to the supply chain and the business partners therein. The main idea of the S-
PORT project has been extended in the project CYSM2, which implemented risk 
management methodology that relies on collaborative modeling and group decision 
making techniques using the collective knowledge of all users [25]. This methodology 
integrates aspects of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code 
[13] as well as the ISO 27001 [18] and thus allows estimating physical and cyber risks 
across diverse target types, attack modes, and geographic levels.  
Recently, the MEDUSA project3  developed a novel supply chain risk assessment 
methodology compliant with ISO28001 [16], ISO27001 [18] and the ISPS Code [13]. 
The MEDUSA methodology [27] concentrates on the business needs and require-
ments of the maritime supply chains and can be applied to assess the risks of a specif-
ic SCS. The derived overall risk values are used to generate a baseline supply chain 
security policy, identifying the least necessary security controls for each participant in 
the supply chain. In addition, the MEDUSA methodology assesses the risk of cascad-
ing threat scenarios within a supply chain. This enables the business partners in the 
supply chain to adapt their security policies according to their business role as well as 
their dependencies. Furthermore, a practical MEDUSA tool4 has been developed  that 
implements the methodology enabling port operators and supply chain business part-
ners to conduct risk assessments of the SC services that are involved in each of their 
domain.  
The current CORE project5 aims to develop an innovative approach to design global 
supply chains, which are resilient (in real-time) to major disturbances caused by high 
impact events. The main idea behind the CORE project is to discover gaps and practi-
cal problems in the global supply chain and to develop capabilities and solutions to 
identify these problems. The focus lies on the interoperability between the business 
partners involved in the supply chain to counter incidents with the potential to disrupt 
the supply chain in real-time. However, CORE does not plan to provide a concrete 
risk assessment methodology for the global supply chain.  
Finally, the ongoing project MITIGATE6 aims to realize a radical shift in supply 
chain risk management methodologies towards a collaborative, evidence-driven ap-
proach, i.e., the MITIGATE methodology presented here, that alleviates the limita-
tions of state-of-the-art risk management frameworks. In the course of the project, a 
collaborative risk management system7 is integrated and validated in maritime use 
case scenarios. The system is parametrized for ports’ SCS and the individual business 
partners will be able to analyze all threats arising from their supply chain cyber assets, 
including threats associated with port CIIs interdependencies and associated cascad-
ing effects.  
 
2 http://www.cysm.eu  
3 http://medusa.cs.unipi.gr  
4 http://medusascsra.cs.unipi.gr  
5 http://www.coreproject.eu 
6 http://www.mitigateproject.eu 
7 http://mitigate.euprojects.net 
3 MITIGATE SCRA Methodology 
A core result of the MITIGATE project is the MITIGATE supply chain risk as-
sessment (SCRA) methodology. The methodology is compliant with ISO 28001 [16], 
ISO 27005 [20] as well as ISO 31000 [17] and aims at estimating the cyber risks for 
all assets of all business partners involved in a maritime SCS. Further, a special focus 
is laid on the cascading effects in multi-sector environments and in the provision of 
support for security processes associated with the dynamic, ICT-based supply chains. 
Therefore, the MITIGATE methodology includes technical, policy-compliant, techno-
economic and usability perspectives into the risk assessment process thus taking the 
viewpoints of a variety of stakeholders into account. 
In more detail, information on the interaction between various cyber assets (i.e., the 
cross-partner’s cyber assets) from the different business partners is required and 
stored in a graph representation. Using specific propagation rules depending on the 
characteristics of each asset, attack paths are identified within the graph. During the 
analysis of these paths, three novel concepts are defined in the MITIGATE methodol-
ogy: the concepts of individual, cumulative and propagated vulnerabilities, impacts 
and risks. Based on these concepts, the cascading effects within the overall graph of 
assets can be estimated by looking at the possible paths in the graph an adversary can 
take to reach a specific asset, thus representing the cumulative aspects, and the possi-
ble paths the adversary can take starting from a specific asset, thus representing the 
propagated aspects (cf. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 for details). Based on the results of 
these analyses, a set of optimal mitigation actions is identified using a game-theoretic 
approach.  
Overall, the main outputs of the MITIGATE SCRA methodology are: 
• a list of all cyber assets within a SCS together with a corresponding 
graphical representation  
• a list of all potential attack paths based on specific propagation rules con-
sidering various attackers’ profiles 
• an estimation on the existence of zero-day exploitable vulnerabilities 
• an evaluation of the individual, cumulative and propagated vulnerabilities, 
impacts as well as risks of all assets 
• an optimal mitigation strategy based on the given set of possible defensive 
measures 
The MITIGATE SCRA methodology can be triggered by any partner within the 
SCS and consists of six main steps (cf. FIG), which represent the recurring main steps 
given in the standard risk management frameworks mentioned above. The realization 
of each block contains several sub-steps (Si.j) as presented in Fig . In the following 
sections, the main steps of the methodology are described in further detail.  
 
Figure 1 – Overview of the six steps of the MITIGATE methodology 
3.1 Step 1: SCS Analysis 
In this first step, the SCS under examination is decomposed. The actors of this step 
are the risk assessors that initiate the assessment in consensus with the business part-
ners (based upon the SLA and the signed ESD). They define the scope of the risk 
assessment in consensus with the other business partners, fixing also the goals and the 
desired outcome of the risk assessment. Further, the business partners involved in the 
SCS under examination are identified, who themselves identify the participants of the 
SCS involved from their perspective, and so forth. 
After all participants of the risk assessment are identified, the main cyber and/or 
physical processes (i.e., controlled/monitored by a cyber system) that comprise the 
examined SCS have to be collected. To achieve that, all cyber assets required for the 
provision of the examined SCS and its respective business process are reported. The 
interdependencies between these cyber assets are of particular interest for the risk 
assessment and thus the interdependencies are characterized using several types (e.g. 
hosting, exchanging data/information, storing, controlling, processing, accessing, 
installing).   
3.2 Step 2: SCS Cyber Threat Analysis 
All threats related to the SCS cyber assets reported in the previous step are identi-
fied and evaluated in terms of their likelihood of occurrence. In more detail, all indi-
vidual cyber threats against all of the SCS cyber assets are collected and stored. To 
compile an exhaustive threat list, the MITIGATE methodology foresees the integra-
tion of multiple source of information, i.e., online threat repositories like the National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD), crowd sourcing and social media as well as the busi-
ness partners’ experts. By taking all these data sources into account, this approach 
helps to increase the quality of the whole risk assessment supports. 
After the threats are identified, the likelihood of occurrence is estimated for each of 
them. Also for this step, several different sources of information are used: information 
from online repositories and social media is taken into consideration as well as histor-
ical data and expert opinions. Again, this helps to obtain a more realistic estimation of 
the likelihood compared to taking only one of these sources. This likelihood is ex-
pressed using a semi-quantitative, five-tier scale and all the gathered information is 
integrated. Finally, a Threat Level (TL) based on this likelihood is assigned to each 
threat.    
3.3 Step 3: Vulnerability Analysis 
Similar to the identification of threats in the previous step, in this step a list of vul-
nerabilities of the cyber assets of the SCS under examination is compiled. In this con-
text, vulnerabilities can be induced through poor configuration, lack of security patch-
ing, etc. The MITIGATE methodology differences between two main types of vulner-
abilities: confirmed vulnerabilities and potentially unknown (zero-day) vulnerabili-
ties. In more detail, vulnerabilities which are already know in the community and are 
listed in online repositories or by specific Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) are understood as confirmed vulnerabilities. On the other hand, vulnerabili-
ties which exist in software systems but are not publicly known are referred to as 
zero-day vulnerabilities.  
Such zero-day vulnerabilities are more dangerous since security experts are not 
aware of them but they can be (easily) exploited by adversaries. Hence, it is important 
to model such unknown and/or undisclosed vulnerabilities in order to gain a pragmat-
ic view of the SC’s risk exposure. To estimate the existence of zero-day vulnerabili-
ties, crowd sourcing and publicly available information on the security of a particular 
system is used. In this way, the estimation can be done over all time scales in the 
available dataset (e.g., by empirically characterizing the distribution of a vulnerabil-
ity’s lifespan) or determining the number of vulnerabilities publicly announced for a 
specific period of time (e.g., using the rate of vulnerability announcements in the 
NVD).  
Confirmed and zero-day vulnerabilities are characterized using specific data com-
ing from the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS), e.g., Access Vector, 
Access Complexity, Authentication, Threat & Vulnerability Categories, Exploitabil-
ity, etc. This data is used to compute the Individual, Cumulative and Propagated Vul-
nerability Level as described in the following three sub-sections. 
Individual Vulnerability Level.  
This step aims at estimating the severity of all (confirmed and zero-day) vulnera-
bilities. In this way, we estimate the likelihood of successfully exploiting each vulner-
ability when all the prerequisite conditions required are met. In the MITIGATE meth-
odology, we rely on qualitative values for representing the Individual Vulnerability 
Level (IVL) and use a five-tier scale ranging from “Very Low” (VL) to “Very High” 
(VH).  
To calculate the Individual Vulnerability Level (IVL) of a specific vulnerability, 
we use parts of the CVSS metrics (i.e., the Access Vector (AV), the Access Complex-
ity (AC) and the Authentication (Auth)) retrieved from the online databases. The de-
tailed mapping from the CVSS metrics onto one category of the five-tier scale is pre-
sented in the following Table 1.  
Table 1. Mapping of the CVSS metrics on the Individual Vulnerability Level (IVL) 
AV 
 
AC  
Auth 
Local Adjacent Network 
High Medium Low High Medium Low High Medium Low 
Multiple VL VL L VL L M L M H 
Single VL L M L M H M H VH 
None L M H M  VH H VH VH 
Cumulative Vulnerability Level  
The key limitation of the Individual Vulnerabilities Level produced in the previous 
step is that the IVL represents the likelihood that the corresponding vulnerability is 
successfully exploited when exposed to an attacker without considering the individual 
actions that the attacker  has to perform to satisfy the preconditions required for their 
exploitation [20], [21].  
Thus, the goal of the Cumulative Vulnerability Level (CVL) is to accurately reflect 
the exploitation level of the vulnerabilities by taking into consideration the IVL, the 
context within which these vulnerabilities appear (e.g. the assets interdependen-
cies/interconnections) and the attacker’s profiles.  
Thus, the CVL measures the likelihood that an attacker can successfully reach and 
exploit a vulnerability, given a specific vulnerability chain. Such a chain describes the 
list of sequential vulnerabilities on different assets that arise from consequential mul-
ti-steps attacks). Each vulnerability chain has one entry point, i.e., a certain vulnera-
bility of a specific asset an adversary uses to break into the system, and one target 
point, i.e., a specific vulnerability on (another) asset an adversary finally wants to 
exploit. In general, several other vulnerabilities on other assets can exist between the 
entry point and the target point, connecting the entry point and the target point based 
on the interdependencies between them.  
Starting from the entry point, an adversary has to exploit one vulnerability after the 
other to reach the target point. His success is determined by his relationship to the 
organization (insider or outsider), his skills (ICT skilled or pre-mature) and his target. 
These attributes of the adversary have to be estimated by the risk assessor beforehand.  
To identify how the vulnerabilities are connected and whether an adversary can hop 
from one vulnerability to another, we use a set of rules to decide whether an asset can 
be compromised to be used as an intermediate step to induce further attacks. In detail, 
in order to deduce:  
• the accessibility of a vulnerability, we use two metric: (a) the Vulnerability 
Access vector’s attribute that shows how a vulnerability can be exploited, and 
(b) the Dependency Access vector’s attribute that shows how the assets are 
connected; 
• the complexity degree of a vulnerability, we consider the attackers’ profiles 
i.e., the skills and characteristics the user grants the attacker and the Vulnera-
bility Access complexity attribute; 
• whether an asset can be used as a stepping stone to launch further attacks on 
other assets, we take into account the technical effects and impact of the vul-
nerability; 
• the exploitability of a vulnerability, we take into consideration whether there is 
an known exploitation technique for the vulnerability. 
From the resulting vulnerability chains not all are equally probable and some can be 
excluded from the calculation of the CVL by the business partners. For each of the 
remaining chains, the Individual Chain Vulnerability Level (ICVL) can be computed, 
indicating the vulnerability level of this chain. First, this computation is based on the 
IVL of a vulnerability and the adversary’s capabilities (also measured on a five-tier 
scale). For each vulnerability involved, these two categories are combined as de-
scribed in the mapping given in Table 2.   
Table 2. Mapping of the Attacker’s Capability and the IVL onto the likelihood of exploitation 
Capability 
 
IVL 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Very Low VL VL L L M 
Low VL L M M H 
Moderate L M M M H 
High L M M H VH 
Very High M H H VH VH 
 
For the non-trivial case that the vulnerability chain is of length 2 or higher, the 
computation of the ICVL has to take all the IVLs (adapted according to the attacker’s 
capability) into account. Therefore, the IVLs have to be “multiplied” or “concatenat-
ed” in a specific way such that in the end, the result is again a vulnera-bility level 
between VL and VH. Therefore, we define a “multiplication” operation “×” to de-
scribe how two vulnerability levels are mapped onto a new level (cf. Table 3). Using 
this operation, the overall vulnerability of the attack chain can be computed from the 
different IVLs along the chain by pairwise multiplying the IVLs, starting from the 
entry point. 
Table 3. Description of the “multiplication” operation × for two vulnerability levels × Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Very Low VL VL L L M 
Low VL L M M H 
Moderate L M M M H 
High L M M H VH 
Very High M H H VH VH 
 
The CVL has to take the ICVLs for all possible chains leading from the entry point 
to the target point into account. To prevent losing some of the information, the ICVLs 
are not aggregated into one value (as it is done in many other methodologies using, 
for example, the maximum approach). In fact, the CVL consists of all the information 
coming from the ICVLs, which are integrated into a histogram. In this way, the CVL 
can be easily represented and also be easily processed in the next steps of the method-
ology.  
Propagated Vulnerability Level.  
Whereas the CVL focuses on all possible attack chains concluding into the same 
target point, the Propagated Vulnerability Level (PVL) inspects the likelihood that an 
attacker can penetrate a network up to some specific depth. In other words, the PVL 
takes all possible vulnerability chains of a specific length into account, starting from 
one particular entry point. Similarly to the CVL, the individual vulnerability chains 
are used for the computation of the PVL. However, the main difference is that the 
length of each chain is limited to a maximum value 𝑙, predefined by the business part-
ners.  
To compute the PVL for a specific entry point, all possible vulnerability chains up 
to length 𝑙 are identified and their respective ICVL is computed. Therefore, we follow 
the same approach as already described for the CVL above. In detail, we use the map-
ping in Table 2 to adapt the IVLs of the identified chains according to the adversary’s 
capabilities and then use the mapping in Table 3 to get to the ICVL of the respective 
vulnerability chain. Similar to the CVL, the PVL consists of the ICVLs of all the vul-
nerability chains and is represented by a histogram. This histogram can then be used 
in the next steps of the methodology. 
3.4 Step 4: Impact Analysis 
Individual Impact Level  
Based on the vulnerability analysis done in the previous step, we are also looking 
at the potential impact exploiting these vulnerabilities might have. To stay consistent 
with the vulnerability analysis, for categorizing the impact we also rely on qualitative 
values ranging from “Very Low” (VL) to “Very High” (VH) to describe the Individu-
al Impact Level (IIL). To calculate the IIL cause by a specific vulnerability, we also 
use information coming from the CVSS metrics (i.e., the three security criteria Confi-
dentiality (C), Integrity (I) and Availability (A)) retrieved from the online databases. 
The detailed mapping from the CVSS metrics onto one category of the five-tier scale 
is presented in Table 4 and provides a single estimation for the overall impact of a 
specific asset/vulnerability combination. 
Table 4. Mapping of the CVSS metrics on the Individual Impact Level (IIL) 
C 
 
I 
A 
None Partial Complete 
None Partial Complete None Partial Complete None Partial Complete 
None VL VL L VL L M L M H 
Partial VL L M L M H M H VH 
Complete L M H M  VH H VH VH 
Cumulative Impact Level.  
Accordingly to the definition of the CVL, the Cumulative Impact Level (CIL) is 
defined as the impact that occurs after a specific asset-/vulnerability-combination has 
been exploited by an attacker using any possible entry point (cf. the Cumulative Vul-
nerability Level in Step 3.4). IN other words, the CIL reflects upon the effects of the 
successful exploitation of a vulnerability at the target point. Similarly to the CVL, 
also the CIL depends on all vulnerability chains originated from all possible entry 
points and leading to the target point. To assess the impact level of a specific vulnera-
bility chain, i.e., the Individual Chain Impact Level (ICIL), the ICVL together with 
the IIL is used. As specified above, the ICVL indicates the likelihood that an adver-
sary (with some predefined capabilities) is able to exploit a specific vulnerability 
chain and the IIL indicates the impact (or damage) the adversary can cause by doing 
that. Table 5 shows how the ICVL and the IIL are combined to map onto the ICIL.  
Table 5. Mapping of the Impact level and the ICVL onto the Individual Chain Impact Level 
Impact 
Level 
ICVL 
Very Low Low Moderate High Very High 
Very Low VL VL L L M 
Low VL L M M H 
Moderate L M M M H 
High L M M H VH 
Very High M H H VH VH 
 
Analogously to the CVL, the CIL consists of the ICILs for all possible paths from 
the entry point to the target point compiled into a single histogram. 
Propagated Impact Level  
The Propagated Impact Level (PIL) is defined as the overall impact that occurs 
when an adversary exploits a specific asset/vulnerability combination and further 
penetrates the network up to a specific depth starting from this entry point (similarly 
to the PVL defined in step XXX above). In other words, this relates to the damage an 
attack can cause at any asset/vulnerability combination on his way through the net-
work. The computation of the PIL runs accordingly to the computation of the PVL, 
i.e., ICILs of a predefined length 𝑙 are used (described by the mapping of ICVL and 
IIL given in Table 5) and then compiled into a histogram to preserve all the collected 
information. Note that the PIL includes the impact of each vulnerability that lies on 
any possible path the adversary can take in the network. Hence, not only the ICVLs of 
length l, but also shorter ICVLs have to be taken into account.  
3.5 Step 5: Risk Assessment 
To estimate the risk level, the vulnerability level as well as the impact level has to 
be taken into account. Additionally, the risk level is specified for individually for each 
threat, hence also the threat level needs to be included in the estimation. In the follow-
ing, we will describe how this is done for each of the three risk levels (Individual, 
Cumulative and Propagated). 
Individual Risk Level.  
The computation of the Individual Risk Level (IRL) is rather straight forward, tak-
ing the IVL and the IIL already defined in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 above and combining 
it with the Threat Level (TL). This combination can be done using the “multiplica-
tion” operation “×” given in Table 3. Therefore, we end up with the simple formula 
 𝐼𝑅𝐿 = 𝑇𝐿 × 𝐼𝑉𝐿 × 𝐼𝐼𝐿 (1) 
As a result, we obtain a risk level according to the five-tier scale (i.e., running from 
VL to VH) for each asset/vulnerability combination. 
Cumulative Risk Level.  
Looking at the Cumulative Risk Level (CRL), the computation becomes a little 
more complex. As a basic principle, we can use the approach from the IRL above and 
combine the TL, the CVL and the CIL to obtain the CRL. However, we have to take 
into account that the CIL already consists of a combination of the ICVL and the IIL 
(cf. Section 3.4 above). Hence, it is fully sufficient to combine only the TL and the 
CIL to obtain the CRL 
 𝐶𝑅𝐿 = 𝑇𝐿 × 𝐶𝐼𝐿 = 𝑇𝐿 × ⋃𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐿 = ⋃𝑇𝐿 × 𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐿 (2) 
Note that the CIL is a collection of all the ICILs represented as a histogram. Hence, 
the above formula means that the TL has to be “multiplied” with each ICIL, separate-
ly. Accordingly, the CRL is again represented as a histogram. 
Propagated Risk Level  
For the computation of the Propagated Risk Level (PRL) we also have to be aware 
that the PIL is already based on the ICVL and thus the PVL does not need to be in-
cluded. Hence, only the TL and the PIL are included in the computation and we have 
the formula 
 𝑃𝑅𝐿 = 𝑇𝐿 × 𝑃𝐼𝐿 = 𝑇𝐿 × ⋃𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐿 = ⋃𝑇𝐿 × 𝐼𝐶𝐼𝐿 (3) 
Also with regards to the PRL we have to note that the PIL is a collection of multi-
ple ICILs and thus in the above formula each of these ICILs has to be “multiplied” 
with the TL. Consequently, the PRL can also be represented as a histogram.  
3.6 Step 6: Risk Mitigation 
In this step, the risk assessment values are compared against specific criteria (set 
and agreed by all business partners), in order to select additional security controls 
required by the business partners and by the SCS (as a whole) meeting these thresh-
olds. For the selection of the optimal security controls a game theoretic approach is 
applied, based on a mathematically sound method to find a way to minimize the ex-
pected damage due to an attack that exploits multiple vulnerabilities. 
We set up a game to optimize the actions of a business partner to minimize the ex-
pected damage. In order to do this formally, we need to describe the actions of both 
the attacker and the defender as well as to assign payoffs for each combination of 
strategies (as described in more detail below). Playing the game then yields an opti-
mal solution in the sense that it indicates which countermeasures should be chosen to 
minimize the damage. 
Attack and Defense Strategies 
The strategies of the adversary are directly linked to the assets he wants to infiltrate 
and accordingly to the vulnerabilities he has to exploit to achieve that. To model the 
attack strategies, we are relying on the information already collected and computed in 
the previous steps. In more detail, the strategies of an adversary are characterized by 
the vulnerability chains he is able to use (i.e., the paths through the network he is able 
to take) to attack a specific vulnerability, i.e., the target node (these chains have been 
identified in Section 3.3 above). 
The strategies of the defender are the available actions and measures he can take in 
order to protect his assets. Besides the potential countermeasures a business partner 
knows from past experiences, vulnerability analysis tools may provide further strate-
gies to mitigate vulnerabilities. For example, a defense strategy could be to do spot 
checking or patching of a specific asset (i.e., closing a specific vulnerability). 
Payoff Estimation for each Scenario 
Each combination of an attack and a defense strategy defines a scenario. In order to 
find an optimal solution, it must be possible to compare the impacts (payoffs) for 
different scenarios. In our context, these payoffs are described by the damage that 
occurs to the business partner and are represented by the IIL, CIL or PIL, respectively 
(cf. Section 3.4 above).  
When modelling one strategy of the attacker, i.e., by choosing a target node and the 
respective vulnerability chains leading to this target, the payoff is the amount of dam-
age he can cause at that particular node. This damage is described by the impact of 
exploiting a specific vulnerability at a particular asset. Since we want to capture all 
possible ways the adversary could exploit that vulnerability, this directly links to the 
CIL. If we were focusing on the total damage an attacker causes inside the network, 
this would correspond to different attack strategies and, accordingly, to the PIL. 
The strategies of the defender are described as changes to the overall structure of 
the network. In detail, a security strategy is able to close a vulnerability, hence elimi-
nating specific vulnerability chains, or to improve the security of some assets, hence 
lowering the likelihood of a successful exploitation be the attacker. To model the 
effect of a defense strategy against a specific attack strategy, the CIL needs to be 
reevaluated based on the new setting. 
Outcome of the Game-Theoretic Approach 
Once all attack and defense strategies are identified and the corresponding payoffs 
for each combination are determined, they are filled into the game matrix. This matrix 
represents the main input to the game-theoretic algorithm, which yields an optimal 
way of choosing the actions of both attacker and defender based on the payoffs given 
in this matrix. This equilibrium yields two piece of information: 
1. An optimal attack strategy. This is a selection of the identified attack strate-
gies, together with a probability for each strategy, which an adversary would 
follow to cause maximum damage to the infrastructure. This represents the 
worst case scenario for the defender. 
2. An optimal defense strategy. This is a selection of the available defense strate-
gies (counter measures), together with a probability for each strategy, which a 
security officer should implement to have the best protection against the worst 
case attack strategy. 
3. A maximum risk level, i.e., the maximum damage that can be caused by an 
adversary following the optimal attack strategy and a defender following the 
optimal security strategy.  
The security measures defined in item 2 are the optimal mitigation actions the se-
curity office can take to be prepared for the worst case scenario. If the security officer 
does not implement these actions accordingly, the adversary will be able to cause 
more damage than given in item 3. Correspondingly, if the adversary deviates from 
the optimal attack strategy given in item 1, he will cause less damage to the infra-
structure and thus end up in a worse situation for him. 
3.7 Operational Context and Assumptions 
Since the scope of the MITIGATE methodology covers different areas within vari-
ous SCS providers, several assumptions have to be made. These assumptions are in 
place to support the development of a methodology that can be used in real life (rather 
than a purely theoretical methodology). In particular, the MITIGATE SCRA method-
ology is designed to operate on asset level, which means that the specific assets and 
implemented controls of each business partner involved in the SCS are necessary 
inputs to the methodology. To ensure the privacy and protection of this data, the part-
ners are asked to provide an Enhanced Security Declaration (ESD), which is a confi-
dential, legally binding document included in the SCS SLA. The ESD reveals the 
commitment of the partners to identify all of their organizations’ cyber assets which 
are relevant for the implementation of the SCS together with the controls already in 
place. The ESD is based on the Security Declaration given in the ISO 28001 and, 
since the MITIGATE methodology is compliant with the ISO 28001, it can be under-
stood as a basic requirement for the methodology.  
On the other hand, we advocate that the interconnection between the cross-
partner’s cyber assets can be represented by directed linear paths. In this context, the 
interdependencies are acyclic to omit circular attack paths during the analysis. Sec-
ond, we postulate that the cross-partners’ cyber assets are used only for the provision 
or delivery of the SCS and are isolated from the partners’ individual ICT infrastruc-
ture. Third, it is also assumed that every SCS is accompanied by a Service Level 
Agreement (SLA) which includes the standard aspects of the SCS (scope, quality, 
responsibilities between the service providers and the service users). It is also worth 
mentioning that MITIGATE SCRA only considers cyber threats and we only consider 
independent attacks and not cyclic attacks (since the SCSs under consideration are 
represented by one way directed graphs). In that context, we assume the three main 
threat categories (loss of confidentiality/integrity/availability) map to specific vulner-
ability categories and we consider that security controls are either implemented or not 
(we omit levels of implementation). For operational purposes, we make use of the 
open NIST national vulnerability repository, although one may use any other reposi-
tory.  
It is worth noting that we consider some of the above operational assumptions 
foundational for the correct operation of the MITIGATE methodology (e.g. ESD), 
while others as important for the current version of the methodology with a view to 
further extend in the near future (e.g. levels of implementation).  
4 Conclusion 
Although there is a plethora of cyber security and supply chain security standards and 
conventions (e.g., ISO27001, ISO27005, NIST Framework, ISO28000, ISO28001, 
ISPS) the literature does not provide clear evidence of practical Supply Chain Risk 
Assessment methodologies that business partners in a logistic chain can comprehen-
sively apply manage its risks and their cascading effects.  
 
In this paper we have presented an overview of the MITIGATE methodology, which 
aims to contribute to the effective protection of the ICT-based supply chain. Curently, 
we are implementing the MITIGATE methodology to a collaborative tool that will 
automate its stages and will enable all business partners within a SCS to perform their 
SCRA. It will be localized in the maritime sector so maritime stakeholders can test its 
functionality and performance.  
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